By Samuel Bola Omotunwase
The passage of the Constitution Alteration Bill establishing State Police by the National Assembly marks one of the boldest constitutional reforms since the return to democratic governance in 1999. It is a recognition of what has long been obvious: Nigeria’s centralised policing architecture has struggled to respond effectively to the country’s complex and evolving security challenges.
For decades, calls for State Police have been met with fears of political abuse, ethnic domination and fragmentation of national security. Yet, rising insecurity across the federation has gradually shifted the debate from whether Nigeria should establish State Police to how it should do so. The current Bill represents a courageous attempt to answer that question. However, while its objectives are commendable, its constitutional architecture leaves several unresolved questions that deserve careful legislative attention before it becomes part of the Constitution.
The first constitutional achievement of the Bill is its acknowledgement of Nigeria’s federal character. It is difficult to justify a federation in which constituent states have responsibility for education, health, agriculture and transportation but lack constitutional authority over internal policing. By creating both Federal and State Police Services, the Bill attempts to restore the federal balance envisioned under the Constitution.
The Bill also seeks to define areas of responsibility between the Federal Police and State Police, reserving national security, terrorism, border protection and other matters of national concern to the Federal Police while allowing states to manage local law enforcement. It further prescribes national standards for recruitment, training and discipline, thereby preventing the emergence of thirty-six entirely different policing systems.
These innovations deserve commendation. Nevertheless, constitutional reform should not merely create institutions; it must also anticipate conflicts that such institutions are likely to generate. It is at this point that the Bill appears less convincing.
Perhaps the most significant constitutional concern is the concentration of policing authority in the office of the State Governor. Under the proposed framework, governors exercise considerable influence over the appointment and operational direction of State Police Commissioners. Although safeguards have been introduced against unlawful directives, Nigeria’s constitutional experience demonstrates that political abuse often occurs through informal influence rather than explicit unlawful orders.
Governors already wield enormous constitutional powers over state finances, appointments and political structures. Adding substantial control over policing without sufficiently insulating the operational leadership of the police raises legitimate constitutional concerns. A police institution established to protect citizens must never become an extension of partisan executive power.
This concern becomes even more significant when viewed against the constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution. Rights to personal liberty, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and political association may become vulnerable if policing is perceived as serving the government of the day rather than the Constitution itself.
The Bill also raises important questions regarding the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. While judicial officers enjoy constitutionally protected tenure and independent removal procedures, comparable safeguards do not appear to exist for State Commissioners of Police. Without security of tenure, operational independence may become more theoretical than real.
Equally troubling is the constitutional uncertainty surrounding overlapping jurisdiction between the Federal and State Police. Criminal activities such as kidnapping, organised crime, cybercrime, firearms trafficking and terrorism financing frequently transcend state boundaries. The Bill recognises concurrent responsibilities but provides limited guidance on which institution assumes priority where both agencies investigate the same offence.
This omission creates the possibility of constitutional conflict, duplication of investigations, forum shopping by suspects and unnecessary rivalry between security agencies. A constitutional amendment of this magnitude ought to establish clear principles governing concurrent jurisdiction, inter-agency cooperation and dispute resolution.
Another significant constitutional omission concerns interstate policing. Criminals do not recognise state boundaries. Can a State Police officer pursue an armed robbery suspect into another state? Can arrests lawfully occur outside territorial jurisdiction? What constitutional procedures govern interstate operations? These questions remain inadequately addressed.
Perhaps the greatest practical weakness of the Bill lies in its transition provisions. Nigeria presently operates a single police institution comprising hundreds of thousands of officers. The Bill does not sufficiently explain how these officers will be redistributed between the Federal and State Police Services.
Will existing officers automatically become members of State Police? Will transfers be voluntary or compulsory? What happens to accumulated pension rights, seniority, promotion prospects and existing conditions of service? How will rank equivalence be determined where officers transfer from one service to another?
These are not administrative details; they are constitutional questions touching upon legitimate expectation, accrued employment rights and the constitutional protection of property and contractual interests. The transition framework should therefore be expressly incorporated into the constitutional amendment or accompanied by comprehensive implementing legislation.
Financial sustainability presents another constitutional dilemma. While the Constitution may authorise states to establish police services, constitutional permission does not translate into financial capacity. Several states already struggle to meet existing obligations, including payment of salaries and pensions. Without objective constitutional benchmarks regarding financial viability, Nigeria risks creating poorly funded police organisations vulnerable to corruption, inadequate training and operational inefficiency.
The Bill also appears silent on the constitutional future of existing regional security outfits such as Amotekun, Ebube Agu, Hisbah and other community security organisations. Will they be absorbed into State Police? Will they continue to exist independently? Could parallel security structures create constitutional confusion regarding command authority and accountability? These issues deserve legislative clarity.
Equally important is the protection of minority communities within states. In plural societies, policing must inspire confidence across ethnic, religious and political divides. The Bill should therefore require constitutional guarantees of equitable recruitment, diversity in appointments and independent civilian complaint mechanisms capable of addressing allegations of discriminatory policing.
Perhaps the most overlooked constitutional issue concerns accountability. Establishing State Police without creating equally strong oversight institutions would merely decentralise existing weaknesses. Independent Police Complaints Commissions, constitutionally protected Police Service Commissions and external civilian oversight mechanisms should receive far greater constitutional attention than they presently enjoy.
Ultimately, the success of State Police will not depend solely on constitutional amendment but on constitutional design. Institutions succeed not because they are created but because they are protected against abuse.
The National Assembly deserves recognition for initiating what may become one of Nigeria’s most consequential constitutional reforms. Yet constitutional history teaches that the durability of institutions depends less on their creation than on the quality of the safeguards embedded within them.
As the Bill proceeds to the State Houses of Assembly for consideration, legislators have a constitutional responsibility to look beyond the immediate excitement surrounding State Police and focus instead on the long-term constitutional architecture that will govern its operation.
Nigeria undoubtedly needs policing that is closer to the people, more responsive to local realities and more consistent with the principles of federalism. However, decentralising police powers without equally decentralising accountability, protecting operational independence, clarifying jurisdictional boundaries and providing a robust transition framework may simply relocate existing problems from Abuja to the thirty-six states.
A Constitution is not merely a legal document; it is the nation’s enduring covenant with itself. The proposed State Police Bill should therefore not only establish another police institution but should also build a policing system anchored on constitutionalism, accountability, professionalism and respect for the rule of law. Only then can State Police become not merely another constitutional experiment, but a genuine instrument for securing both the Nigerian State and the constitutional rights of its citizens.
Dr. Omotunwase, a constitutional lawyer, writes from Owo.
Views expressed by contributors are strictly personal and not of Precision News.





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